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Abstract 
This paper applies the multiple streams approach to a multi-level implementation setting to 
analyse why Swiss member states enabled the labor market integration of asylum seekers 
between 2000 and 2003. It argues for integrating the social construction of target groups into 
the problem stream, and complementing the policy stream with inherited policy paths. A fuzzy-
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis reveals that institutionalised policy paths trump politics 
in explaining the enabling of labour market integration of asylum seekers. Conversely, a weak 
political left combined with negative problem constructions aces out policy paths in explaining 
restrictions of labour market integration. Results illustrate how social constructions influence 
problem framing. Historical institutionalism theory helps us understand how inherited policy 
logics feed back with actors’ problem perceptions. Due to the parallels in their multi-level 
systems, political contexts and problem pressures, this historical case offers salient lessons for 
the refugee crisis in the European Union today. 
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The large number of refugees entering Europe will challenge the European Union (EU) to 
reconcile its multilevel structure with the integration of asylum seekers into its economy. This 
paper uses a historical case to analyse how the interplay of politics, problems and inherited 
policy paths affects whether asylum seekers are granted access to the labour market. It employs 
the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA; Kingdon, 1984) to study the respective implementation 
strategies of Swiss member states (cantons). Even though “Kingdon did not attempt to provide 
a framework that explained the dynamics of subsequent stages in the policy process (Zahariadis, 
1995, 2007; Zahariadis and Allen, 1995)” (Howlett et al., 2015: 421), we argue that MSA can 
be fruitfully used for the study of member state implementation. While Zahariadis and 
Exadaktylos (2015) focus on entrepreneurial strategies to understand implementation decisions, 
we show that the MSA is also well suited to understand implementation decisions in federalist 
systems. Switzerland is an extreme case of decentralised member state implementation of 
federal law (Ehrler and Sager, 2011; Sager and Zollinger, 2011). This makes it a paradigmatic 
case which can inform our understanding of how the MSA explains implementation decisions. 
Like Zahariadis and Exadaktylos (2015: 3, also Ridde, 2009) we “view policy outputs as 
constituting implementation windows”. The federal policy decision thus opens an 
implementation window that implies additional political decision-making processes at the level 
of the constituent states when transposed into cantonal law. This process embraces fundamental 
adjustments that result in a substantial diversity of cantonal implementation strategies.  
We analyse a setting in which the Federal law granted the cantons the possibility to integrate 
asylum seekers into their labor markets. High refugee rates, anti-immigrant attitudes and 
“welfare chauvinism” (see e.g. Freitag and Rapp, 2013) can trigger competition for scarce 
resources and challenge solidarity with asylum seekers (Boräng, 2014). Yet not granting asylum 
seekers the right to work may not mediate that competition: Hatton (2009: F209) shows that 
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“the policies that deter [asylum] applications are those that limit access to territory and those 
that reduce the proportion of claims that are successful. (…) Policies that diminish the 
socioeconomic conditions of asylum seekers evidently have little deterrent effect and they may 
even contribute to the subsequent deprivation that many asylum seekers experience” (see also 
Keogh, 2013). Asylum seekers are likely to inflict burdens on the welfare state (Boräng, 2014) 
as “new migrants and refugees especially constitute a category with particular problems in 
accessing the labor market” (Hagelund and Kavli, 2009: 259). Asylum seekers’ early 
integration into the labor market can be decisive for a successful subsequent integration into 
other societal spheres as well. This integration is hence one of the major challenges that 
destination countries face today (Toshkov and de Haan, 2013). 
Previous analyses of Swiss asylum policy “unambiguously support the contention that 
decentralised implementation might be linked to the unequal treatment of individuals” (Holzer 
et al., 2000: 270; Spörndli et al., 1998). We compare the restrictions imposed by 24 Swiss 
cantons to integrate pending asylum seekers into the labour market between 2000 and 2003, 
using both existing and newly collected data. To understand the considerable cantonal 
differences in the cantonal integration strategies, we propose two refinements of the MSA. 
First, as Knaggard (2015: 450) highlights, "the MSF would benefit from further development 
of the problem stream (...) [P]roblem framing as a separate process (...) affects (..) agendasetting 
and decision making". In this vein, this paper argues that policy problems are fundamentally a 
matter of perception, which in turn may differ between bureaucratic and political party actors. 
Elected officials grant target groups – here: asylum seekers - more or less rights (e.g., access to 
the labor market), depending on how the social construction of this target group within the 
constituency shapes their perception of the policy problem and appropriate solutions (Herweg 
et al., 2015; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Steinacker, 2006). Asylum seekers as non-citizens 
without a right of residence might not be considered as deserving to get access to the labour 
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market (Boräng, 2014; Steinacker, 2006). Responsive governments may then choose not to 
grant asylum seekers access to the labour market. The solutions adopted depend on these actors’ 
power to influence policy-making. Second, policy inheritance in the form of existing welfare 
institutions affect solidarity with migrants (Boräng, 2014). We hence follow Spohr (2016) in 
complementing the MSA with historical institutionalism. Inherited policy paths impact and 
interact with the actors’ problem perception. This implies that a focus on the combined effects 
of problem-related factors, politics (actor constellations), and policy paths is needed to 
understand how a policy problem is perceived and what solution is adopted. Fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2008), combined with formal theory 
evaluation (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Thomann 2015), is an especially appropriate 
method for analysing the theorised joint effects of these different streams (Sager and Rielle, 
2013). 
We now embed our test case in this discussion before deriving explanations for (non-
)restrictions of labour market integration and theoretical expectations on the interaction of the 
streams. Based on the results, we then evaluate these propositions. Our results underscore how 
existing welfare institutions and the social construction of target groups influence the 
solidaristic treatment of vulnerable populations. The findings reveal, first, that bureaucratic 
actors are more relevant than political parties for enabling the labor market integration of 
asylum seekers. Second, institutionalised policy paths dominantly contribute to explaining why 
the state grants asylum seekers the right to access the labor market. Conversely, third, 
constellations entailing political factors and a negative problem social construction of asylum 
seekers contribute to restrictions of this access.  
The late Stein “Rokkan recommended that anyone wishing to study the dynamics of European 
politics should immerse him or herself in the study of Switzerland” (Freitag and Rapp, 2013: 
440). We correspondingly conclude by discussing the results’ scope, drawing parallels to the 
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EU multilevel system and discussing possible lessons for the current refugee situation in 
Europe. 
The Swiss case 
Switzerland has a fairly long tradition of granting asylum to political refugees, with the 
significant exception of World War II. In the 1970s, when the composition of asylum seekers 
changed and their numbers grew, asylum policy became a major public issue. A host of 
revisions of the first Asylum law from 1981 to date have consisted essentially in the constant 
increase of the threshold for granting asylum recognition (Lavenex, 2007: 632-635). While 
asylum proceedings are regulated at the federal level, the pending asylum seekers are allocated 
to the cantons, proportionate to population size. The cantons organize housing, allocate social 
assistance, foster integration and, if the asylum decision is negative, are responsible for 
expulsion. “The tightening of the Asylum Law has led to a shift of the financial burden of the 
asylum system towards the cantons, which in turn has resulted in the increased politicization of 
the topic. The cantons are thus responsible on the one hand for the often protracted 
implementation of the removal of rejected asylum seekers, and, on the other hand, for the 
additional costs caused by rejected applicants (…)”(Lavenex, 2007: 635). 
Until 2004, the federal government bore the costs of social assistance in the asylum system. In 
1995, flat-rate contributions were introduced. To make the cantons reduce their spending on 
social assistance for asylum seekers, the revised Federal Decree on measures to decrease 
spending on the asylum system introduced severe cutbacks in the flat rates in 1999. This 
instrument was in force until 2004, when a federal austerity program again tightened the law. 
Since then, rejected asylum seekers are no longer entitled to statutory social assistance except 
for “emergency assistance” (Nothilfe).  
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We study the time between 2000 and 2003, when the federal government covered limited per-
diems for asylum seekers in need of social benefits. In this particularly politicised policy field, 
the cantons had two options for reducing social spending on refugees: the expulsion of asylum 
seekers with a negative decision, and enabling the integration of asylum seekers into the labor 
market. The asylum law allowed for the gainful employment of pending asylum applicants after 
a period of three months. However, the cantons were not obliged to apply this rule. Since high 
expulsion rates do not indicate restrictions of asylum seekers’ labor market integration and vice 
versa, we focus only on the integration measure.1 Labour market integration denotes the 
openness of cantonal regulation to the integration of asylum seekers into the labour market. It 
is measured using Piguet and Misteli’s (1996) labour market restriction index as applied in 
Spörndli et al. (1998). The index encompasses  
a) the cantonal regulations regarding the length of the working prohibition,  
b) the principle of preferring natives for open jobs,  
c) the obligation for employers to actively look for native job candidates,  
d) working permit limitation for certain industries, and  
e) the possibility for asylum seekers to switch between different industries.  
The data was newly collected for this study based on a written survey of all responsible cantonal 
authorities in 2004 (return rate 100%). The original survey in German language is indicated in 
the online appendix. Piguet and Misteli (1996) define three degrees of restriction, namely low 
restriction (1-5.5); medium restriction (6-8.5) and high restriction (9–15). Low restrictiveness 
indicates that cantonal policies enable the labor market integration of asylum seekers (INT); 
high restrictiveness indicates that cantonal policies impose restrictions on labor market 
integration (int). We consider cantons with a labour market restriction index of less than 7.25, 




-- Figure 1 about here -- 
 
In comparing how Swiss cantons implement the same policy, we employ a “most similar 
systems” design that holds most institutional and macroeconomic contextual conditions 
constant (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). This enables us to focus on selected possible explanations 
for the different degrees to which some cantons chose to give asylum seekers access to the job 
market, while others did not (Figure 1). 
Conditions for integration 
We consider the Federal Decree on measures to decrease spending on the asylum system from 
1999 as opening an implementation window (Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, 2015; Ridde, 2009) 
within which the cantons had to choose their implementation strategies. The MSA allows us to 
model different constellations of actors, problem perceptions and policy contexts to understand 
the respective decisions. This framework conceives of policy decisions as the result of a 
simultaneous conjunction of three different streams at a given time: Problems, policies, and 
politics are independent, exogenous streams flowing through a system (Zahariadis, 2014: 31). 
Policy decisions are not necessarily a rational reaction aimed at resolving functional problems 
(Sager and Rielle, 2013: 6). “More often solutions search for problems. People work on 
problems only when a particular combination of problem, solutions, and participants in a choice 
situation make it possible” (Kingdon, 1984: 91). Along with Spohr (2016), this paper argues 
that MSA analysis should integrate inherited policy paths, which distribute decision power and 
coin actors’ identities and interpretations of situations (Boräng, 2014; Olsen, 2001). While the 
implementation window was present in all cantons between 1999 and 2004, what differs 
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between the cantons is the interplay of actor constellations (politics stream), problems and the 
policy inheritance (policy stream).  
To address the “many variables, few cases” issue, we analyse six causal conditions, which are 
composed, overall, of ten indicators. If two indicators represent the same theoretical reasoning, 
then we consider them as functionally equivalent secondary-level dimensions of one basic-level 
condition. Such factors are combined using the logical operator “OR”, denoted by +. When 
several indicators need to be observed in combination, this is expressed with the logical operator 
“AND”, denoted by * (Goertz, 2006: 40, 41). Adopting QCA notation, we use capital letters if 
a feature is present and lower case letters if the feature is absent.  
Politics stream 
The politics stream encompasses the broader environment within which policy is made, in terms 
of specific actor constellations (Ackrill et al., 2013: 873). We consider two sets of actors with 
different approaches to policy problem solving. First, party political actors are responsive to 
electorates (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Conversely, second, the public administration 
pursues goals that are mainly problem driven, i.e. technical (Sager, 2007a: 432, Sager, 2007b 
236; Sager and Rielle, 2013). If they are powerful enough to influence policy making, then 
these actors’ responses to their divergent problem definitions will shape the whether asylum 
seekers are granted the right to access the labor market. “MSA places policy entrepreneurs and 
their strategies at the heart of policy change” (Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, 2015: 3). However, 
our main analytic interest lies in the configurations of conditions under which the streams are 
coupled, rather than the actual coupling processes. We hence do not include the policy 
entrepreneurs in our comparison, but discuss their role in the process in our analysis of deviant 
cases. 
According to the “parties do matter” view (Castles, 2000) and the literature on party ideology 
and migration (Lavenex 2004, 2007; Manatschal, 2015), cantons with a strong major party of 
8 
 
the left (L) in the executive are more willing to integrate asylum seekers (INT). Conversely, 
strong right-wing parties (RM) propose a restrictive asylum system and may hence oppose 
integration (int). This holds especially for the populist Swiss Peoples Party (SPP) - the Radicals 
dominantly oppose a strong welfare state and could hence be in favour of enabling integration 
(Lavenex, 2004; Manatschal, 2015). Thus, we only consider the cantonal executive to have a 
strong right-wing majority (R) if the SPP also holds at least 50 per cent of the right-wing seats 
(SPP): 
R = RM*SPP. 
The bureaucracy is a political actor in its own right (Sager and Rielle, 2013: 1). Hence, we 
expect that the coupling of the politics and problem stream may depend on the strength of the 
bureaucracy. In highly professionalised public administrations, vertical epistemic community 
effects can lead to converging problem analyses, regardless of the political circumstances 
(Sager, 2005). These epistemic communities also include vested interests, such as those of 
labour organizations, who in Swiss corporatism display great proximity to the administration. 
We use the size of a cantonal bureaucracy as a proxy for its political strength. The larger the 
bureaucracy (B), the higher its degree of professionalisation and specialisation tend to be 
(Sager, 2003).  
Traditionally, another aspect of the politics stream is the national mood, meaning that a fairly 
large number of individuals in a given country tend to think along common lines (Zahariadis, 
2014: 34). As we study member state implementation, the relevant group of voters is the 
cantonal electorate. In the following, however, we propose to conceptualize the attitudes of the 
electorate as part of the social construction of asylum seekers that defines the problem stream. 
We do so because “work from psychology (…) has shown how common decision heuristics 
can influence (…) the saliency of the problem and evaluation of the possible policy solutions” 
(Steinacker, 2006: 460). 
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Problem stream  
The problem stream refers to conditions that policy-makers, interest groups and other policy 
actors believe warrant attention (Ackrill et al., 2013: 873). However, what decision-makers 
conceive to be the relevant problem that requires a solution is not exogenously given: problems 
do not exist but have to be defined by someone (Knaggard, 2015: 452). While the MSA has 
always highlighted this (Kingdon, 1984; Herweg et al., 2015: 436), Knaggard (2015: 451) also 
emphasizes that “studies using the MS[A] hide[s] the power present in defining public 
problems. Public problems are here seen as those understood as being in need of political 
action." 
Party political actors seek to comply with voters’ preferences due to the need to be re-elected 
(Sager, 2007a: 435). “Parties are interested in promoting issues they own, and care about how 
much their proposals impact their chances of re-election” (Herweg et al., 2015: 441). Voters’ 
preferences are influenced by “the cultural characterizations or popular images of the persons 
or groups whose behavior and well-being are affected by public policy” (Schneider and Ingram, 
1993: 334). Therefore, the problem perceptions of responsive politicians are to a large extent 
influenced by the social construction of the relevant target groups, which “indicate whether the 
problems of the target population are legitimate ones for government attention, what kind of 
game politics is (…), and who usually wins” (Schneider and Ingram, 1993: 340). Hence, the 
population defines the problem by social construction, which in turn „influences public 
judgments of problem saliency and of the preferred policy approaches” Steinacker (2006: 460). 
This resonates with Herweg et al. (2015: 438) who also argue that the relevance of problems in 
the problem stream is related to public opinion: “policy makers will start to perceive a condition 
as a relevant problem if they believe that its persistence threatens their re-election”. Thus, we 
expect the social construction of the target group “asylum seekers” to be the relevant problem 
definition for the implementation decision of political parties in need of reelection.  
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While asylum seekers are per definition powerless, the political attitudes of the population 
indicate their social image as being deserving or undeserving (Lavenex, 2007; Lenschow et al., 
2005). The main indicator for political attitudes in Switzerland is language. German-speaking 
regions (G) have a less liberal attitude towards asylum seekers than many cantons in the Latin 
cultural settings, and urbanised regions (U) are generally more liberal than rural regions 
(Christin et al., 2002). We further consider the cantonal results in the public vote on the SPP’s 
popular initiative “Against asylum abuse” on November 24, 2002, which called for a further 
tightening of the Asylum Law. An attitude which is unfavourable toward asylum seekers (A) 
is observed in two instances: first, if a canton is both German-speaking AND rural, OR second, 
if a high share of the population voted for the “Against asylum abuse” initiative (V). The canton 
Ticino, for instance, is not German-speaking, but still displays an unfavourable attitude because 
of the high share of anti-immigration votes. 
A = (G*u) + V. 
According to Steinacker (2006), if asylum seekers are perceived as deserving (a; dependents), 
then the choice of policy is likely to be beneficial, in our case, enabling integration (INT). 
Conversely, if asylum seekers are constructed negatively (A; deviants), then party politicians 
seek to claim credit for being tough on the unworthy group (int).  
Conversely, we posit that cantonal bureaucracies define the problem functionally in view of the 
labour market situation: “public administration (…) will seek the technically best policy design, 
that is, the solution most adequate to the problem under discussion” (Sager 2007a: 436). If the 
labour market is already highly saturated, then it would constitute a contradiction to integrate a 
fresh workforce. High cantonal unemployment rates (UR) may indicate high saturation. Yet 
most asylum seekers with work permits concentrate only on the hotel and restaurant industry, 
where a varying share of seasonal workers obtain their permits from the cantons (SW).2 The 
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labour market is too saturated to facilitate the integration of asylum seekers (S) if either the 
rate of unemployment is high OR there are already many seasonal workers: 
S = UR + SW. 
Policy stream 
In his conceptualization of the policy stream, Spohr (2016: 252) employs historical 
institutionalism by claiming that “ideas have to fulfil the criteria of technical feasibility and 
value-acceptability to win acceptance in policy-networks. Technical feasibility means that 
policies have to be implementable to be chosen, which involves compatibility with existing 
institutional or organisational structures (…). Thus, the institutional setting is important for the 
criterion of technical feasibility.” Accounting for existing policies means rejecting “the 
traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere 
in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features 
of a given situation often inherited from the past” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 941; see also 
Thomann and Manatschal, 2015).  
The need to make an implementation decision – here, the choice between enabling or restricting 
integration – was present in all cantons between 1999 and 2004. What differs between the 
cantons is the policy inheritance within which this decision was made. Cantonal policy paths 
characterise the implementation of unemployment law (Battaglini and Giraud, 2003). A 
reintegration-oriented implementation strategy is directed toward improving placement 
capability, filling gaps in the qualifications of the unemployed, and diminishing the negative 
consequences of unemployment (Battaglini and Giraud, 2003: 288).  
Inherited policy paths can be expected to play an important role in the MSA framework, because 
the problem perceptions of policy makers may partly be based on a sense of identity that is 
known, accepted and anticipated (Olsen 2001). Especially in migration policy, existing welfare 
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state institutions impact the boundaries of social solidarity, enhance generalised trust, and 
influence citizens’ views of how the state can and should protect individuals (Boräng, 2014). If 
this is true, inherited policy paths defining the policy stream can “rule out” and replace the 
prevailing problem perceptions (attitudes or labor market saturation). Existing, integration-
oriented welfare institutions are hence functionally equivalent to an integration-prone problem 
stream; it takes either of the two for policies that grant asylum seekers the right to access labor 
markets. For both political party actors and bureaucratic actors, a reintegration-oriented policy 
path (P) can equally produce a tendency toward enabling integration (INT).  
 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
 
Table 1 reports the six conditions that result from these ten indicators and their expected impact 
on both enabling and restricting integration. The MSA implies that theoretical expectations 
must be formulated on the combined, instead of isolated, effects of these factors. In terms of 
method, we take this causal complexity into account by employing fsQCA. In terms of theory, 
we now derive theoretical expectations on the interplay of politics, problems and institutional 
path dependencies.  
Hypotheses 
Above, we have outlined four assumptions:  
1. Policy choices are made only when a particular combination of actor constellations 
(politics), problems and solutions in a choice situation make it possible (Sager and Rielle, 
2013: 6). Politics, problems and policies are a necessary part of different conjunctions, 
which only jointly are sufficient for () enabling or restricting integration.  
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2. Different social constructions of asylum seekers provoke different problem assesments of 
political party actors seeking reelection.  
3. The cantonal bureaucracies act according to the salience of the technical (functional) 
problem of labour market saturation.  
4. Both political and bureaucratic actors refer to cantonal policy paths, which can replace the 
problem stream in the MSA. 
We can hence hypothesise two alternative explanations for policies enabling integration and 
another two restrictions on integration. 
First, a strong political left will favour enabling integration if the population’s attitude is 
favourable toward asylum seekers or the canton has an integration-friendly policy path. 
Generally, party political actors are only clearly dominant when the cantonal bureaucracy is 
weak. Formally, we can write this as follows: 
H1: L*b*(a + P)  INT 
However, second, if the cantonal bureaucracy is strong, then it favours enabling integration if 
either the labour market is not too saturated or the canton has an integration-friendly policy 
path. For the cantonal bureaucracy to dominantly favour enabling integration, the political right 
must be weak. 
H2: B*r*(s + P)  INT 
Third, in the absence of a strong bureaucracy, a strong political right effects restrictions of 
integration if the attitude of the population is unfavourable toward asylum seekers and the 
canton has an integration-averse policy path:3 
H3: R*b*A*p  int 
14 
 
Finally, fourth, if no dominant political left pushes for integration, then a strong bureaucracy 
will favour restrictions of integration when the labour market is already saturated and the canton 
has an integration-averse policy path: 
H4: B*l*S*p  int. 
The combined effects of these factors are tested using the research strategy now presented. 
 
Data and methods 
To account for the interaction of the politics stream, the problem stream, and inherited policy 
paths, we employ fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin, 2000; Rihoux and Ragin, 
2008). Based on Boolean algebra and its fuzzy extension, the core interest of the QCA method 
lies in identifying the necessary or sufficient conditions for a certain outcome.4 QCA allows for 
the causal complexity behind a given phenomenon. This entails, first, the assumption of 
conjunctural causality, meaning that the effect of a single condition unfolds in combination 
with other conditions (subsequently called configurations or paths), as the MSA assumes. The 
notion of equifinality then captures that integration may have several, mutually non-exclusive, 
context-dependent explanations. The assumption of causal asymmetry entails that enabling 
integration can be explained differently than restrictions of integration (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012: 78).  
Fuzzy-set QCA (Ragin, 2000) translates variables into sets, e.g., the set of “cantons enabling 
labor market integration”. During the “calibration” process, the cases’ set membership is 
determined based on substantive and theoretical knowledge. Set membership may vary from 
the thresholds for full and non-membership with a crossover point (neither in nor out). For 
example, a canton may fully enable integration (1) or fully restrict integration (0). The decisive 
crossover point above which integration policies are more enabling than restricting (INT) and 
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below which integration is more restricted than enabled (int) is 0.5. Because the numerical 
distances between the scores do not continuously have the same qualitative meaning (see Figure 
1), we calibrate labour market integration using the indirect method of calibration, which 
involves an initial grouping of cases into previously defined set-membership scores (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012: 35). Due to limited space, the measurement, descriptive statistics and 
calibration of the sets are discussed in depth in online appendix A. Lacking information on 
policy paths leads to the dropout of the cantons Schaffhausen and Thurgau (Battaglini and 
Giraud 2003). 
After calibration, all logically possible combinations of conditions are listed in a “truth table”. 
Each case belongs to a configuration (row). The following logical minimisation process 
identifies the shortest possible causal expression for those configurations implying the outcome 
(the solution term). The basic idea is that if an outcome, e.g., INT, is found in a canton 
displaying conditions L, B and P, as well as in another case displaying L and B, but not P, then 
the presence or absence of P obviously does not make a difference for the occurrence of INT. 
Formally, we can write this as L*B*P + L*B*p → INT and minimise it accordingly to L*B → 
INT. 
To evaluate the results, consistency indicates the degree to which the statement of sufficiency 
or necessity is in line with the empirical evidence at hand. Furthermore, the proportional 
reduction in inconsistency (PRI) indicates the degree to which a given causal configuration is 
not simultaneously sufficient for both the occurrence and the non-occurrence of the outcome. 
Coverage indicates how much of the empirical information has been explained (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012: 128, 139, 235-239). 
The choice of appropriate levels for these measures is research-specific. Consistency should 
not fall below 0.75. For necessary conditions, a lower consistency threshold of 0.9 applies; 
coverage expresses their empirical relevance in terms of not being much larger than the outcome 
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and the Relevance of Necessity (RoN), in terms of the condition being close to a constant 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 143, 147). When deciding upon the raw consistency 
threshold for sufficient truth table rows, we considered “gaps” in the consistency values and 
low PRI scores. A further criterion was then the absence of deviant cases consistency in kind 
with qualitatively different membership scores in the condition and outcome sets (Schneider 
and Rohlfing, 2013). The prioritisation of consistency and differing calibration methods 
produce low coverage value that does not adequately reflect the solution’s acceptable 
explanatory power: About two thirds of all cases are explained. 
We tested the robustness of our results against different calibration thresholds, see online 
appendix B (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 285-293; Skaaning, 2011). Applying the 
Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) procedure, we resort to the intermediate solution, make 
theoretically informed directional expectations (Table 1), and ensure that the results of necessity 
and sufficiency are coherent with each other (software: R packages QCA and SetMethods; Dusa 
and Thiem, 2014; Quaranta, 2013). The raw data, prime implicants, alternative solution terms, 
truth tables, indications on limited diversity, and untenable and simplifying assumptions are 
reported in online appendix C (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 167ff, 200ff).  
 
Results 
We now briefly present the results before discussing them more in depth. We first assessed the 
presence of necessary conditions for enabling and restricting integration (Table C1 online 
appendix). We find that the absence of a strong political left in the cantonal executive is needed 
for restrictions of integration. The only canton where integration was restricted despite the 
presence of a strong political left is Berne, where the unique situation of a political deadlock 
between a strong left (L) and an even stronger right (R) in the Bernese government rendered 
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the executive virtually hamstrung. While the left was formally strong, it had a limited capacity 
to act, thus being de facto weak. 
Three scenarios are sufficient for enabling integration (Table 2). The consistency of single paths 
and of the whole solution term is indicated below, together with the cantons that display them. 
Raw coverage expresses how much of the outcome is covered by a single path, and solution 
coverage does the same for the solution term, while unique coverage indicates how much a path 
uniquely covers (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 127-128, 139, 143ff). 
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
It catches the eye that an integration-friendly policy path (P) is always part of the story for 
enabling integration – although this is not enough on its own. Inherited policy paths defining 
the policy stream hence have a high empirical relevance. Conversely, the picture is not 
theoretically consistent regarding the presence or absence of the relevant actor constellations of 
the politics stream – in particular, the presence of a strong left seems causally irrelevant. Thus, 
policy paths ace out politics for enabling the labor market integration of asylum seekers. 
In the first configuration, covering Grisons (GR), the actor constellation of a strong political 
right (R) with a weak bureaucracy (b) and an integration-friendly policy path (P) implied that 
cantons enabled integration. Here, the policy path seems to have guided the political right’s 
decisions. It is worth noting that the SPP in Grisons has always been considerably more liberal 
than other branches of the party. In addition, workers from abroad play an important role in 
Grison’s highly tourism-oriented economy and its agriculture, which is reflected in low 
restrictions to work in different branches. The second configuration is empirically most relevant 
in covering six cases. Here, the political right was weak (r), but the bureaucracy dominant (B). 
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Together with a positive construction of asylum seekers (a) and an integration-friendly policy 
path (P), this implied policies enabling integration. A typical case is Basel city (BS), whose 
close neighborhood to Germany and France nourishes a very international and generally liberal 
self-concept of the population. Due to its high share of immigrants, Basel city has almost by 
necessity taken on a lead role in innovative integration concepts for foreigners. The third 
configuration comprises three cantons in which the political right was weak (r). As attitudes 
were favourable (a), the labour market was not saturated (s), and the policy path was 
pronouncedly integration-friendly (P, maximum value in all three cantons), asylum seekers’ 
integration into the labour market was enabled. These three cantons are not known as 
particularly liberal, but traditionally dominated by Christian Democratic parties that promote 
altruistic values. These cantons do have policies that prefer natives over asylum seekers, but no 
other restrictions. 
 
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the good consistency of this solution. In the upper left quadrant, five (out of 
14) cases of enabling integration appear that cannot be explained by this solution.  
Three different configurations are sufficient for restricting integration (int) (Table 3). 
Unfavourable attitudes toward asylum seekers are always present, although they must combine 
with other factors. Hence, the combination of a negative construction of asylum seekers with a 
weak political left proves to be an essential part of the story why the former are restricted access 
to the labour market. Conversely, policy paths play an empirically less prominent (relevance 
only in four cases) and theoretically inconsistent role. Thus, for restricting integration, politics 




-- Table 3 about here -- 
 
The first two configurations cover six cases that share the actor constellation of weak political 
parties and an equally weak bureaucracy (l*r*b). Furthermore, the population has a negative 
image of asylum seekers (A). Unexpectedly, in the first configuration, this combines with low 
levels of labour market saturation (s), and in the second configuration, with an integration-
friendly policy path (P), to imply restrictions of integration. These paths represent German-
speaking cantons dominated by centrist parties like Schwyz, relatively unaffected by 
immigration in practice but with a population that is highly mobilized on anti-immigration 
issues. These cantons tend to restrict asylum seekers’ labor market integration to specific 
branches, and have a pronounced “natives first” policy. The third configuration captures two 
cases where the left was weak (l) and the bureaucracy strong (B). As expected, here, the joint 
effect of a negative attitude toward asylum seekers (A), a highly saturated labour market (S), 
and an integration-averse policy path (p) was that asylum seekers were restricted access to the 
labor market. Uri, for instance, is one of the oldest, traditionally conservative and demarcation-
oriented, Swiss cantons with a highly agriculture-oriented economy characterized by an already 
high share of seasonal workers. Zurich is Switzerland’s largest city, target of commuting 
workers from all over the country, and the stronghold of the SPP. 
As Figure 3 shows, this solution, too, has a good consistency and covers no less than nine cases. 
Three cases of restricting integration remain unexplained. 
 




We now discuss deviant cases for coverage as part of the explorative logic of QCA, which aims 
at going beyond a mere testing of theories to improve and refine the concepts and frameworks 
applied (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). Nidwald is the “most deviant 
case coverage” for enabling integration. The canton Glarus has the same constellation of 
explanatory factors as Nidwald, but restricts integration. And indeed, Glarus is also one of the 
three “unexplained” cases of restricting integration. What factor made the difference here, 
which was neglected in our study?  
The MSA concept of policy entrepreneurs helps us understand these cases. Zahariadis and 
Exadaktylos (2015) highlight the crucial role of policy entrepreneurs to couple the streams in 
order enact and implement policy changes. The main difference between the two cantons lies 
in the personalities of the individual members of the executive responsible for asylum policy as 
policy entrepreneurs. In Nidwald, the respective minister, Leo Odermatt, was member of a local 
green party (Demokratisches Nidwalden) that stood for a very liberal and social progressive 
asylum policy. His counterpart in Glarus, Willy Kamm, was member of the center-right liberal 
party (FDP). In 2002, the voters in Glarus decided to reduce government seats from seven to 
five as per 2004, which led to an intensification of the competition for re-election. 
Distinguishing himself through high expulsion rates saved an absolute majority for Kamm in 
the next elections. These case analyses suggest that short-term political considerations are 
significant for explaining the labour market integration policy for asylum seekers. This makes 
perfect sense, given the high politicisation of the issue. It also confirms that in addition to 
general party positions and actor strengths, policy entrepreneurs play an important role in the 





We now discuss our hypotheses following Ragin’s principles of theory evaluation, as extended 
by Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 295-305). The scenarios expected and those not expected 
in the hypotheses are compared with the scenarios that were empirically (not) observed to 
answer three questions: First, which parts of the theory are supported by the findings? These 
are the areas shaded white in Tables 4 and 5 below. Second, in which direction should theory 
be expanded (grey areas)? Third, which parts of the theory need to be dropped (dark areas)? 
We computed the intersections of the theoretical expectations with the conservative solutions 
and their logical complements. The formal details are presented in online appendix D. 
 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
 
The upper left quadrant of Table 4 provides no empirical support for our first hypothesis on the 
role of a dominant political left in combination with an integration-prone problem stream. In 
contrast, our second hypothesis is, in fact, partly reflected in the results. If the politics stream 
encompasses no strong political right-wing force pursuing an opposite policy (r), then a strong 
bureaucracy (B) opts for enabling the integration of asylum seekers into the labour market, 
sticking to the integration-friendly policy path (P). However, H2 was too bold in two respects: 
First, the bureaucracy also refers to the problem stream in terms of a positive construction of 
the target group in this situation (a). Hence, second, our results do not support the assertion that 
the bureaucracy is the actor primarily guided by technical problems: We observed H2 both in 
cantons with a highly saturated labour market (S) and in cantons with a strong left (L). These 
two factors only become irrelevant if we introduce counterfactual reasoning (Table 2). 
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The lower left quadrant of Table 4 turns our attention to alternative, unexpected explanations 
of why cantons grant asylum seekers access to the labour market. Two cases reveal that even if 
none of the three types of actors dominate the politics stream (l*b*r), this can imply enabling 
integration if the problem stream (a*s) and integration-friendly policy paths (P) unambiguously 
point to integration. Another case suggests that even when the political right is the dominant 
actor (R*l*b) and the problem stream points to low integration (A*S), asylum seekers are given 
the right to work if the policy path is integration-friendly (P).  
The right half of Table 4 indicates a low empirical relevance to delimit theory and confirms that 
we overlooked possible explanations for enabling integration (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 
302-303). As we argued above, such factors include a more differentiated conception of the 
politics stream, namely, the personalities of policy entrepreneurs and short-term political 
considerations in electoral campaigns. 
 
-- Table 5 about here -- 
 
Table 5 neither shows evidence for hypothesis three nor a relevance of a strong political right 
for restricting access to the labour market in general. In fact, the upper right quadrant reveals 
that contrary to all of our expectations, the actor constellation of a dominant right with a weak 
bureaucracy (R*b), a negatively constructed target group (A) and an integration-averse policy 
path (p) can still imply enabling integration.5 The case of Aargau, where this happened, is 
indeed a Sonderfall. The population is unusually split, and there is a strong group of activists 
who actively support the integration of asylum seekers (Schmidt, 2014). 
Conversely, the upper left quadrant of Table 5 provides some support for our fourth hypothesis, 
namely that a dominant bureaucracy (B*l) will opt for restricting asylum seekers’ access to the 
labour market if the latter is too saturated (S) and the policy path is integration-averse (p). 
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Hypothesis 4 needs refinement as, again, the assumption that the negative construction of the 
target group (A) is irrelevant for the bureaucracy was misleading.  
Similar to the results for enabling integration, we failed to hypothesise that a politics stream 
with no dominant actor can imply restricting integration if asylum seekers are constructed as 
undeserving (l*r*b*A) (lower left quadrant of Table 5). Interestingly, in this situation, the 
attitudes of the population seem to dominate the problem stream and to somewhat “rule out” 
the fact that either the labour market is still receptive (s) or the policy path is integration-friendly 
in principle (P).  
In summary, we have found no empirical support for our two hypotheses, which stated that an 
interplay of party political actors seeking re-election with the social constructions of the target 
group “asylum seekers” in the population and / or policy inheritance would matter for 
integration. This is somewhat surprising, given the high politicisation of this policy issue. Yet 
party politics did matter: First, the absence of a dominant political left favouring integration 
was a necessary condition for policies restricting the labour market integration of asylum 
seekers. Second, the issue was instrumentalised in electoral campaigns. Conversely, we did find 
empirical support that a strong bureaucracy acts according to inherited policy paths. The 
results highlight the usefulness of complementing the MSA framework with policy inheritance: 
Existing welfare institutions sometimes “replaced” the problems stream in the MSA. However, 
the public administration referred less to technical problems than was expected; the social 
construction of target groups does matter for the bureaucracy. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of these findings. 
Conclusions 
Member state implementation within federal systems can lead to distributive injustice and – in 
the case of asylum law – unequal treatment of individuals. The present study corroborates this 
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finding for the labour market integration of pending asylum seekers by the cantons (Holzer et 
al., 2000; Spörndli et al., 1998). Considering the MSA, refined with inherited policy paths and 
socially constructed problems, by use of fsQCA has generated a number of important insights 
for explaining why Swiss member states do or do not grant asylum seekers the right to access 
the labor market.  
Our results illustrate that complex combinations of factors are decisive for such implementation 
choices. Partly as a consequence, the adoption of an implementation strategy has reasons that 
differ from the reasons for non-adoption of the same strategy. Whether Swiss member states 
enable asylum seekers’ access to the labour market is largely, although not exclusively, a 
question of institutionalised policy paths (Battaglini and Giraud, 2003; Boräng, 2014; Olsen, 
2001): policy paths trump politics. Conversely, in explaining restrictions of labour market 
integration, the problem and politics streams ace out the policy path (Lavenex, 2007; Lenschow 
et al., 2005). Whether member states choose to restrict asylum seekers’ access to the labour 
market very much depends on constellations entailing unfavourable political constellations and 
attitudes (Steinacker, 2006). Here, the social construction of the target group “asylum seekers” 
as undeserving, in combination with the absence of a strong left defending the welfare state, 
plays a pivotal role (Hagelund and Kavli, 2009; Schneider and Ingram, 1993). 
At a theoretical level, our results confirm that it makes sense to include historical 
institutionalism theory in order to fully grasp multiple streams dynamics in comparative 
research (Spohr 2016). Decision-makers act not only “arbitrarily” in conjunction with 
problems, solutions and opportunities, but also according to inherited policy logics, as 
expressed in cantonal policy paths (Battaglini and Giraud, 2003; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Olsen, 
2001). Once such logics become institutionalised, they feed back with actors’ problem 
perceptions and might even replace the problem stream (Spohr 2016). This supports recent 
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findings that more comprehensive existing welfare institutions are, via norms in society and 
politics, positively associated with a solidaristic treatment of asylum seekers (Boräng, 2014).  
Our results also confirm that it is relevant to account for the socially constructed nature of policy 
problems (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Steinacker, 2006). The way policy makers frame 
policies to become a “problem” interacts with the prevailing perceptions amongst 
constituencies of the target group’s deservingness (Herweg et al., 2015; Knaggard, 2015). 
However, our expectation that this particularly holds for actors that are held accountable by the 
electorate has only found partial empirical support. Our results suggest an important role for a 
strong bureaucracy (Sager and Rielle, 2013). In fact, despite the high politicisation of the 
asylum issue and contrary to the “parties-do-matter” view (Castles, 2000), findings indicate a 
somewhat higher relevance of the absence of political parties than of their presence for the 
policy decisions under study. Notwithstanding this, popular attitudes toward the target group 
were a decisive part of the explanation particularly for restrictions to labour market integration. 
Indeed, bureaucracies neither only nor mainly refer to technical problems, but also define the 
problem according to the social construction of target groups (Sager, 2007a; Sager 2009).  
Can we derive lessons from the Swiss case after the turn of the millennium for the current 
refugee situation in the EU? In other words, are EU member states today likely to act in similar 
ways as Swiss member states then (Kiser and Levi, 1996)? Indeed, the two cases display 
important analogies regarding the diverse and multi-levelled nature of the systems, the relevant 
political context and the problem pressure.  
Due to its cultural, linguistic, religious, and regional diversity, Switzerland represents a 
microcosm of Europe (Freitag and Rapp, 2013: 440). Switzerland’s highly decentralized 
federalist system also grants similarly high levels of discretion to member states as the European 
Union’s multilevel governance structure, with a continuous balancing act between effective 
political representation and efficient policy-making that often results in the “levelling out” of 
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centralized decisions during their implementation (Börzel and Hosli 2003; Sager et al 2014; 
Thomann 2015). Politically, the turn of the millennium marked the sharp rise of a right-wing 
populist party – the SPP – based on the mobilization of anti-immigrant and anti-Europe attitudes 
in Switzerland, which is now, fifteen years later, also taking place (to varying degrees) in the 
rest of Europe (Manatschal, 2015; Mudde, 2013). The “asylum problem” triggered by the 
Kosovo war was perceived as extremely pressing in Switzerland fifteen years ago, and is very 
salient now in Europe due to the war in Syria. Switzerland only signed the Dublin Regulation 
in 2004 (entry into force in 2008) and hence constituted a second external frontier and possible 
place of refuge for asylum seekers whose application was rejected in the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) (Toshkov and de Haan, 2013). 
EU asylum policy today is also comparable to the Swiss Federal asylum policy back then. 
Toshkov and de Haan (2013: 661) found that despite the up-scaling of EU asylum politics, the 
formulation and design of national asylum legations still matters. The EU has had only a limited 
impact on the changes in asylum policy outcomes, and there is no sign that burden-sharing has 
increased between member states over the last decade. Although some reforms by EU member 
states have aimed to bring their asylum policy in line with EU legislation, “for the most parts 
policy reforms were country-specific responses to political pressures and alleged deficiencies 
in the existing system” (Hatton, 2009, F199).  
Clearly, this comparison across historical and country contexts has limits (Rihoux and Ragin 
2009). The EU is less politically integrated and covers a much larger territory than Switzerland, 
with a significantly higher variation in historical and cultural backgrounds, institutional, 
administrative and economic capacities, and political systems. The current refugee situation 
also arguably has an extreme scope both regarding the amount of people seeking refuge, and 
the complexity and transboundary nature of its catalysts. Overall, this variation points toward 
persistent national differences despite some convergence (Toshkov and de Haan, 2013). 
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So far, the CEAS has not proved to be resilient to crisis and no distribution mechanism of 
asylum related welfare costs is in sight. Our historical case tentatively suggests that, if the role 
of institutionalised policy paths persists in the European context, then asylum seekers in the 
current refugee situation might primarily be integrated into the labor markets of certain 
countries with an already access - friendly tradition (Thielemann and Hobolth 2016). 
Conversely, many countries with strong anti-immigrant perceptions and a weak political left 
may deny asylum seekers access to their labor markets if they are given the opportunity. 
Simultaneously, these differences are unlikely to guide refugees’ immigration decisions 
(Hatton, 2009; Keogh, 2013). The long-term consequences of unequal labor market integration 
strategies for the common challenge that the overall integration of refugees and associated 
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1 Pearson’s r = 0.0. Source: Federal Office for Migration, Asylstatistik 2000-2004, retrieved from 
https://www.bfm.admin.ch/bfm/de/home/publiservice/statistik/asylstatistik/jahresstatistiken.html . 
 
2 The status of seasonal workers was abolished in 2002, the effect of which, however, does not affect our research 
period. 
3 As integration-friendly policy paths can “overrule” the actors’ problem perception emerging from an integration-
averse problem stream, policy paths also have to be integration- averse for restrictions of labour market integration 
to occur (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 79-81).  
4The term “outcome“ is used for the explanandum in QCA studies. The outcome to be explained in this study is 
not a “policy outcome” in terms of a behavioural change of target groups, but a policy output of cantons. 
5 The conjunction B*l*S*p*a is a logical remainder. 
                                                 
Tables  
Table 1: Conditions for labour market integration and directional expectations 
 
Causal conditions Indicator sub-dimensions 
Ceteris paribus, condition produces 
policies 
enabling             
integration 
when… 
restricting           
integration 
when… 
Strong leftist parties 
L 
 Present Absent 
Right-wing majority (RM) 
Significant SPP (SPP) 
R = RM*SPP 
Strong bureaucracy 
B 
 No expectation No expectation 
German language region (G) 
High degree of urbanisation (U) 
Unfavourable asylum vote (V) 
A = G*u + V 
High unemployment rate (UR) 
High share of seasonal workers 
(SW) 




















Table 2: Sufficient conditions for enabling integration 
 R  *  b * P + r  *  B *  a *  P  + r  * a  *  s *  P    INT 
Single case 
coverage GR BS, FR, GE, NE, TI, VD FR, LU, ZG  
Consistency 0.825 0.941 0.965  
Raw      
coverage 0.066 0.446 0.210  
Unique    
coverage 0.046 0.310 0.083  
   Solution consistency 0.926 
   Solution coverage 0.578 
Dark shade: politics stream, grey shade: problem stream, white shade: policy stream. 
Bold: enhanced causal interpretability (parsimonious solution). 
Raw consistency threshold 0.824.  
 
Table 3: Sufficient conditions for restricting integration 
 l * r * b *A * s + l * r * b * A * P  + l * B * A * S * p  int 
Single case 
coverage AR, BL, SG, SZ SO, SZ UR, ZH  
Consistency 0.874 0.854 0.916  
Raw      
coverage 0.376 0.320 0.272  
Unique    
coverage 0.134 0.044 0.155  
   Solution consistency 0.885 
   Solution coverage 0.610 
Dark shade: politics stream, grey shade: problem stream, white shade: policy stream. 
Bold: enhanced causal interpretability (parsimonious solution). 





Table 4: Theory evaluation for enabling integration (INT) 
 Empirics 
Detected in solution Not detected in solution 
Hypothesised B*r*P*a*(S + L) 
 
 
N(INT): 6 supports theory 
N(int): 0 
 
L*b*a + L*b*P + B*r*s*(l + p + A) 
+ B*r*P*A 
 
N(INT): 0  
N(int): 0 
Only N(int) > 0 delimits theory 




N(INT): 3 extend theory 
N(int): 0 
r*A + R*a + b*a*S + r*b*S + l*B*s 
+ L*A + B*A + L*b + L*R + R*B + 
A*s + R*s + p 
 
N(INT): 5 point to overlooked 
explanations 
N(int): 10 support theory 
 
Supports theory Extends theory Delimits theory 
Based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 301). 
Bold: hypothesised combinations. 




Table 5: Theory evaluation for restricting integration (int) 
 Empirics 





N(int): 2 support theory 
N(INT): 0 
 




N(INT): 1 (AG) delimits theory 
 




N(int): 5 extend theory 
N(INT): 0 
 
b*a + a*s + L*r + r*b*S*p + L*B + 
R*P + B*P + a*P + L*P +L*a + B*s 
 
N(int): 3 point to overlooked 
explanations 
N(INT): 13 support theory 
 
Supports theory Extends theory Delimits theory 
Based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 301). 




Figure headings and captions   
Figure 1: Labour market restriction index, 2000-2003 
 
Notes: Restriction index = sum of cantonal scores in: length of working prohibition according to art. 21 AsylG (6 
months = 3, 3 Months = 0), the principle of preferring natives for open jobs (allover = 3, partly = 1.5, none = 0), 
the obligation of employers to actively look for native job candidates (general obligation = 3, obligation for certain 
branches = 1.5, no obligation = 0), working permit limitation to certain branches (existent = 3, inexistent = 0) and 
the possibility for asylum seekers to switch between different branches (not possible = 3, possible after 24 months 
= 1.5, possible after 12 months = 1, no restriction = 0). 
Key: AG= Aargau; AI= Appenzell Innerrhodes; AR = Appenzell Outerrhodes, BE= Berne, BL= Basel Land, BS= 
Basel City, FR = Fribourg, GE= Geneva, GL = Glarus GR= Grisons, JU= Jura, LU= Lucerne, NE= Neuchâtel, 
NW = Nidwald, OW= Obwald, SG= St Gall, SO= Solothurn, SZ= Schwyz, TI= Ticino, UR= Uri, VD= Vaud, 





Figure 2: Sufficient conditions for enabling integration 
 
Notes: The cases situated above the diagonal are fully consistent. Deviant cases for coverage are in the upper left 
quadrant, and deviant cases for consistency in kind cases are in the lower right quadrant. The cases in the lower 
left quadrant are not directly relevant (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 67ff, 308). The case memberships are 





Figure 3: Sufficient conditions for restricting integration 
 
Notes: The cases situated above the diagonal are fully consistent. Deviant cases for coverage are in the upper left 
quadrant, and deviant cases for consistency in kind are in the lower right quadrant. The cases in the lower left 
quadrant are not directly relevant (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 67ff, 308). The case memberships are 
calculated with rounded scores (two decimals). 
 
 
 
